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1 Introduction 
Venture capital (VC) investors are considered a fundamental source of finance for 
entrepreneurial ventures (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2001; Sapienza, 1992). However, the number of VC-backed companies is small: in 
2016, only 3,134 companies in Europe (source: Invest Europe 2017 yearbook) and 7,750 
companies in the U.S. (source: NVCA 2017 yearbook) received VC. 
One prominent reason for such a limited number of VC-backed companies is the fact that VC 
investors carefully screen investment opportunities and select for their investments only a tiny 
fraction of the proposals they receive (2% according to Fried and Hisrich, 1994, even lower 
based on Petty and Gruber, 2011). While this “supply-driven” motivation for the small number 
of VC-backed companies has been studied at length in the literature, the demand side of the issue 
has received much less attention. Mason and Harrison (2001) identify three demand-side factors 
that can explain why so few companies obtain VC. First, the quality of many entrepreneurial 
ventures that look for VC is simply not high enough to attract VC investors. Second, even 
ventures with good prospects may fail to secure VC if the presentation skills of their owners are 
not adequate to impress VC investors. Third, entrepreneurs may simply not look for VC at all.  
Most of the ventures created by these latter entrepreneurs are probably of low quality, and 
entrepreneurs correctly anticipate that they would be unattractive to VC investors. However, 
there might be entrepreneurs who abstain from seeking VC in spite of the high quality of their 
ventures. This issue has not received adequate attention by previous studies, in spite of its 
potential importance. The thickness of the VC market depends on both the supply and the 
demand for VC (Gans and Stern, 2010; Roth, 2008). If entrepreneurs who may have a chance of 
obtaining VC abstain from seeking it, the VC market becomes thinner and the likelihood of an 
effective match between entrepreneurs and VC investors decreases (Bertoni et al., 2018). 
In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap. We look at the demand for VC and argue that the 
costs and benefits associated with VC investments, as they are anticipated by entrepreneurs, 
depend on the location of their ventures with respect to prospective VC investors. VC is an 
expensive source of funding for entrepreneurs (Brav, 2009; Bruno and Tyebjee, 1985) 
considering the dilution of ownership, the transfer of control rights and the direct search costs 
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associated with establishing contacts and negotiating with VC investors. Arguably, geographic 
distance increases such costs and decreases the potential benefits of VC. If entrepreneurs with 
high-quality ventures anticipate that the costs of VC backing may outweigh its potential benefits 
because of geographic distance from prospective investors, they may not be willing to look for 
VC, with negative implications for the aggregate demand for VC, especially in peripheral 
regions.  
Studying how ventures’ location influences the demand for VC contributes to enlarge the scope 
of the literature on the “geography of VC” (Chen et al., 2010; Cumming and Dai, 2010; 
Lindgaard Christensen, 2007; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). The geographical distribution of VC 
investments is not even; most investments are concentrated in specific areas such as Silicon 
Valley, the Boston and New York metropolitan areas in the U.S., and the London and Paris 
metropolitan areas in Europe1. The literature has focused on the supply side of the market to 
explain the uneven geographical distribution of VC investments. VC investors are spatially 
concentrated in “VC hubs” that are located in financial centres and high-tech regions, and exhibit 
a strong tendency to invest nearby.2 A few studies have suggested that the uneven geographical 
distribution of VC investments may also be a reflection of demand-side factors, as companies in 
peripheral regions are less likely to seek VC (Bertoni et al., 2016, 2018; Mason and Harrison, 
2002). We take a further step by investigating how geographical distance, national borders and 
the characteristics of prospective VC investors influence the stimulus generated by the 
availability of VC on ventures’ demand for VC.  
These issues are especially important for European ventures. The low level of VC investments in 
Europe compared with the U.S. and the fragmentation of the European VC market into separated 
national markets are considered prominent reasons for the underdevelopment of the European 
high-tech entrepreneurial ecosystem (European Commission, 2007). Elucidating how the 
                                                 
1 In 2016, ventures located in California, Massachusetts, and New York accounted for 75% of U.S. VC dollars 
invested and 52% of the total number of U.S. VC deals (source: NVCA 2017 Yearbook). As we show later, 
according to our data, the Inner London and Île-de-France (Paris) regions represented 21.3% and 15.7%, 
respectively, of the new VC investments in Europe between 1984 and 2009. 
2 This “local bias” of VC investors is the result of both the location of their networks of informants (Cumming and 
Dai, 2010) and the need for spatial proximity to effectively monitor their portfolio companies (Lerner, 1995). 
4 
 
location of European ventures and VC investors influences ventures’ demand for VC may help to 
clarify the source of the European anomaly. 
Accordingly, our empirical investigation is based on a sample of 533 European high-tech 
entrepreneurial ventures extracted from the VICO database. The VICO database includes 
information on young high-tech ventures located in seven European countries – Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – and is particularly appropriate 
for our analysis. VICO is designed to include companies that are very likely to be potential 
targets for VC investments. The European dimension of the VICO database offers an ideal test 
bed to assess the impact of national borders on ventures’ demand for VC. The availability of VC 
differs remarkably across European countries and regions. In addition to two large VC hubs 
located in the London and Paris areas, several other VC hubs are heterogeneously distributed in 
other countries (Martin et al., 2005, for instance, show that in Germany, the VC industry is 
spread across six hubs). The panel dimension of the VICO database is also interesting for our 
purposes. Our dataset includes observations between 1984 and 2009, which gives us the 
opportunity to observe the development of the different VC markets over 25 years.  
The 533 VICO companies included in our sample are the respondents of a survey that was 
administered in 2010. The survey asked ventures whether and when they actively looked for 
external equity3 in the first 15 years of their existence. We complement company-level 
information from the VICO database with longitudinal VC market-level data on the availability 
of VC across European regions and the level of competition in local VC markets. The latter 
information is extracted from Thomson One.  
Our results show that proximity to VC hubs where there is a large availability of VC is a key 
driver of ventures’ propensity to look for external equity, but this effect rapidly declines with 
geographical distance and vanishes beyond 250 km. It also vanishes when crossing national 
borders. The negative effect of distance from prospective VC investors on the demand for VC 
                                                 
3 The survey did not directly inquire about ventures’ search for VC but rather about “equity that is provided by 
sources other than founders, their family members and friends”. Therefore, our study investigates whether the 
location of European ventures and that of prospective VC investors influence ventures’ demand for external equity 
from whatever source. In our theorizing, we assume that ventures’ demand for external equity and for VC are 
closely related.  
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varies with the characteristics of those VC investors in terms of their ownership and governance 
(Bertoni et al., 2015; Dimov and Gedajlovic, 2010) and reputation (Nahata, 2008; Pollock et al., 
2015; Sorensen, 2007). Independent (i.e., US-style) VC investors have a strong positive effect on 
the demand for external equity in a radius of 250 km, while for governmental VC investors (i.e. 
VC firms owned by governmental bodies), the corresponding effect is much weaker, 
disappearing beyond 50 km. With respect to reputation, the stimulating effect on the demand for 
VC of highly reputed VC investors extends to ventures that are located abroad. In addition, we 
find that the level of competition (proxied by concentration) in local VC markets does not 
significantly influence ventures’ propensity to look for external equity. Finally, we investigate 
the effects of cultural and institutional differences across countries on the demand for VC and 
find that national borders represent a lower barrier if the cultural and institutional distance 
between two countries is lower. 
Our findings are robust to endogeneity issues due to the potential reverse causality between 
location and the demand for external equity4, concerns related to the attractiveness of our sample 
companies for VC investors, a possible non-response bias, the Internet bubble period, the 
presence of multi-office VC firms and changes in the model specification.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we build on the existing literature to develop the 
theoretical framework of this study. In section 3, we present the data used in our econometric 
analysis. In section 4, we describe the econometric model. We discuss the main results and 
robustness checks in sections 5 and 6, respectively. In section 7, we provide additional evidence 
illustrating how the negative effects of geographical distance and national borders on the 
stimulus on the demand for external equity generated by the availability of VC depend on the 
characteristics of VC investors and cultural and institutional difference between countries. In 
section 8, which concludes the paper, we summarize our main results and discuss the study’s 
                                                 
4 In the main analysis, we assume that entrepreneurs are unlikely to choose the location of their business according 
to the availability of VC in a given area. This assumption is well supported by existing literature (Audretsch and 
Stephan, 1996; Bertoni et al., 2018; Michelacci and Silva, 2007; Zucker et al., 1998). Nevertheless, in the empirical 
section, we present robustness checks that mitigate concerns about potential reverse causality between the location 
of sample ventures and their demand for VC.  
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contribution to the VC literature, the study’s limitations, directions for future research, and the 
study’s managerial and policy implications. 
2 Theoretical framework: how location influences the demand for venture capital 
2.1 The expected costs and benefits of accessing VC and the demand for VC 
The benefits of VC are well documented. First, the injection of financial resources reduces 
financial constraints in entrepreneurial ventures (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Second, the 
“coaching” of entrepreneurial teams by VC investors and the network of contacts they bring to 
their portfolio companies enhance their value (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992).  
Despite these benefits, only a minority of firms seek external equity (and VC) to finance their 
businesses (Ou and Haynes, 2006; Vos et al., 2007). In Cosh et al.’s (2009) study of UK 
entrepreneurial ventures, out of the 2,520 sample companies, 952 sought external finance during 
the observation period, but only 87 attempted to approach a venture capitalist. Under some 
conditions, entrepreneurial ventures may prefer alternative sources of finance, such as public 
subsidies or crowdfunding, and may even choose to adapt their business models to a less capital-
intensive setting so that they can operate without VC.5  
Indeed, companies will not look for VC if its expected benefits do not compensate for its 
expected costs. The first and most obvious cost that entrepreneurs incur while obtaining VC is 
the dilution of their ownership stakes. Dilution is amplified by information asymmetries, as VC 
investors facing such asymmetries ask for a “lemon” premium (Akerlof, 1970) to compensate for 
their extra risk and thus offer lower pre-money valuations (Brav, 2009).  
Subtler costs associated with VC arise from the potential loss of control. VC contracts typically 
include performance-contingent clauses that partition control rights between existing and outside 
investors (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). These clauses limit entrepreneurs’ decision autonomy, 
                                                 
5 The drawbacks of VC and the careful analysis that is required to evaluate the benefits and costs of having VC 
investors on board are often mentioned in the business press. See, e.g., https://www.valuewalk.com/2018/06/avoid-
venture-capital-straight-talk-for-startups/ and https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkwilliams/2017/04/17/the-case-for-
avoiding-venture-capital/#eb567d73c788. 
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especially when their venture’s performance is poor (Burchardt et al., 2016). The risk of losing 
control of the company discourages entrepreneurs from seeking VC. In accordance with this 
argument, Brav (2009) shows that UK private firms with less dispersed ownership, i.e., those 
with a stronger desire to retain control, are less likely to rely on external equity financing and 
have higher debt ratios.  
Finally, new ventures must face additional (opportunity or real) costs merely to have access to 
the VC market. Considerable money and time are required to write an appealing business plan, to 
search for and meet prospective investors, to prepare an elevator pitch, to carry out due diligence, 
to protect intellectual property and finally, to negotiate and conclude a deal (Carpentier and 
Suret, 2006). Bruno (1985) estimates that the median time that ventures spend searching for 
funds is four to five months, but for 20% of their U.S.-based sample, it was more than eight 
months.  
Below, we argue that the location of new ventures with respect to prospective VC investors 
influences the balance between the anticipated costs and the anticipated benefits of obtaining 
VC, thereby making ventures either more or less inclined to seek VC.  
2.2 Geographical distance from prospective VC investors and the demand for VC 
Despite advances in information and communication technologies and physical infrastructures 
(most notably low-cost flights and high-speed trains), the geographical distance between 
ventures and prospective VC investors is likely to reduce the benefits and increase the costs 
entrepreneurs anticipate will be incurred by obtaining VC, negatively influencing their 
propensity to seek VC. 
Even if the World Wide Web in principle allows entrepreneurs to find information on VC 
investors located all over the world and contact them with little difficulty, in practice this rarely 
happens. First, entrepreneurial ventures located far from VC hubs tend to be less aware of the 
benefits of VC and less likely to look for it. Indeed, the word-of-mouth effect generated by other 
local VC-backed ventures is still a fundamental driver of the demand for VC. As Martin et al. 
(2005) argue, “Experience and knowledge of the local VC market spread through the local 
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business and information networks to encourage additional entrepreneurial activity to seek 
private equity” (p. 1214).  
Second, even if entrepreneurial ventures are aware of the benefits of VC, they probably know 
that VC investors typically rely on their local information networks to screen business proposals 
(Cumming and Dai, 2010; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) and seldom invest without a referral from 
a trusted informant (Fiet, 1995). Hence, entrepreneurs have to rely on their social capital to get in 
contact with prospective VC investors (Shane and Cable, 2002). However, entrepreneurs’ social 
networks also tend to be geographically concentrated around their premises (Stuart and 
Sorenson, 2003) and therefore may hardly include prospective VC investors located far away. 
For such VC investors, geographical distance amplifies information asymmetries and creates 
greater uncertainty because of the unfamiliarity with the context in which the focal venture is 
embedded. Faced with greater information asymmetries and uncertainty, VC investors may 
demand a higher “lemon” premium to invest at a long distance, increasing the anticipated costs 
of obtaining VC for distant ventures (Carpentier and Suret, 2006).  
Geographical distance matters also in the post-investment period. Proximity allows for more 
frequent meetings between VC investors and their portfolio companies, and therefore for more 
effective coaching and monitoring. Better coaching boosts the expected benefits of VC, while 
more effective monitoring reduces expected agency costs (Cumming and Dai, 2010). The 
negative effects of geographical distance on effective coaching and monitoring are attenuated but 
not eliminated by advances in transportation, which have progressively reduced the costs of face-
to-face meetings between entrepreneurs and distant VC investors (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2016).  
In sum, we expect that geographical distance from prospective VC investors has a negative 
influence on a focal venture’s demand for VC because it increases the expected costs of VC and 
decreases its expected benefits. It is a crucial empirical issue to quantify this effect and 
investigate the distance from prospective VC investors at which the stimulus on the demand for 
VC disappears. Moreover, the distance decay of the stimulus likely depends on the 
characteristics of VC investors. In this study, we consider two characteristics that have attracted 
the attention of VC scholars: the ownership and governance of VC investors (Bertoni et al., 
2015; Dimov and Gedajlovic, 2010), distinguishing private and public (i.e., government-owned) 
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VC investors, and their reputations (Nahata, 2008; Pollock et al., 2015; Sørensen, 2007). 
Previous studies show that the positive impact on portfolio companies of governmental VC 
investments is more limited than the impact of private VC investments (e.g., Alperovych et al., 
2015; Bertoni and Tykvova, 2015; Brander et al., 2015; Cumming et al., 2017; Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2014). Moreover, the impact of VC investments is higher if the investors are more 
reputed (Nahata, 2008; Sørensen, 2007). Therefore, entrepreneurs may anticipate smaller 
benefits from obtaining VC from governmental VC investors and larger benefits from obtaining 
it from more reputed VC investors.6 Accordingly, the negative effect of distance from 
prospective VC investors on the stimulus on the demand for VC should be weaker from more 
reputed investors. The opposite should hold for governmental VC investors (i.e., we expect a 
weaker stimulus that vanishes more rapidly with greater geographical distance). 
2.3 Cross-border availability of VC and the demand for VC 
Entrepreneurs may go beyond national borders in their search for VC. Cross-border VC inflows 
may compensate for potential limits in the domestic VC supply (Schertler and Tykvová, 2012). 
Moreover, cross-border VC has potential benefits for entrepreneurial ventures over and above 
those that they can obtain from domestic VC. Foreign VC investors may help entrepreneurial 
ventures expand their business into the country of the investor (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005) or 
exploit the exit opportunities there, if local exit conditions are inadequate (Bertoni and Groh, 
2014). Thus, one might expect entrepreneurs to be especially inclined to look for VC if their 
ventures are located in proximity to foreign VC hubs, where there is an abundant availability of 
VC.  
However, other factors could make access to foreign VC extremely costly for entrepreneurs. 
First, entrepreneurs and prospective VC investors located in different countries are set apart by 
linguistic and cultural distance, which implies differences in values, beliefs and practices. These 
differences increase the information asymmetries and perceived investment risks for VC 
investors, resulting in greater anticipated costs for entrepreneurs in terms of ownership dilution 
                                                 
6 The larger benefits entrepreneurs anticipate from obtaining VC from more reputed investors are indirectly 
witnessed by the premium they pay for this type of investment, which Hsu (2004) estimates to be as large as 14%. 
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and loss of control rights. They are also likely to make coordination between entrepreneurs and 
VC investors more difficult, which in turn makes VC investors’ coaching and monitoring less 
effective, reduces the expected benefits and increase the expected agency costs of VC 
investments (Dai et al., 2012; Li et al., 2014; Nahata et al., 2015).  
Second, cross-country differences in regulations and tax policies increase the complexity and the 
costs of due diligence on the part of VC investors (Cumming and Macintosh, 2003; Wright et al., 
2005). This is particularly true in Europe, especially before the introduction of the European VC 
passport in 2013 (European Parliament, 2013). As noted by the European Commission, “in a 
fragmented venture capital market with currently 27 different operating environments, fund 
structuring across multiple borders becomes increasingly complex and smaller funds tend to 
avoid operating outside their home jurisdictions” (European Commission, 2007). As a result, 
entrepreneurs will again anticipate higher costs of obtaining VC from foreign VC investors. 
In sum, whether the expected benefits of cross-border VC investments exceed the expected costs 
is an interesting empirical question that can be approached by looking at the impact of the 
availability of VC beyond national borders on ventures’ propensity to look for VC. Moreover, 
the cultural and institutional distance between the countries in which entrepreneurs and 
prospective VC investors are located is likely to negatively moderate this relationship. 
2.4 Competition in the VC market and demand for VC  
Ventures’ location may also influence the terms that VC investors offer them. Gompers and 
Lerner (2000) find important geographical differences in the pre-money valuations that VC 
investors offer their target companies. They suggest that in regions with high competition among 
VC investors for a limited number of attractive targets, VC investors offer higher valuations to 
entrepreneurs.  
More generally, the more competitive the local VC market, the better the conditions that VC 
investors must offer to local entrepreneurs to secure promising investment opportunities. If local 
entrepreneurs anticipate inferior dilution costs and a lower loss of control rights, they will be 
more willing to look for VC. Therefore, we expect that the level of competition in the local VC 
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market has a positive influence on the VC-seeking propensity of entrepreneurial ventures located 
in the same region. 
3 Data 
3.1 Sample 
We test our predictions on a panel dataset composed of 533 European high-tech entrepreneurial 
ventures that were potential or actual targets of VC investments and responded to an online 
survey we administered in 2010. The sample companies were extracted from the VICO 
database7, which includes detailed information for a large sample of high-tech entrepreneurial 
ventures operating in seven European countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. All ventures included in the sample were founded after 1984, 
were independent at their foundation (i.e., they were not controlled by other business 
organizations), and operate in the following high-tech manufacturing and service industries: 
nanotechnology; biotechnology; pharmaceuticals; computers; electronic components; 
telecommunications equipment; precision, optical and medical instruments; robotics; aerospace; 
software; telecommunications services; Internet and multimedia services; web publishing; 
renewable energies; R&D and engineering services. 
The VICO database includes two strata of ventures: 759 VC-backed ventures and 7,611 non-VC-
backed ventures that are “potential targets of VC investments” (Bertoni and Martí, 2011). VC-
backed companies received the first VC round from 1994 to 2004 when they were no more than 
10 years old. They were randomly extracted from commercial databases (i.e., Thomson One, 
VC-PRO, and Zephyr) and country-specific proprietary databases, including the yearbooks of the 
Belgium Venture Capital Association and the Finnish Venture Capital Association, the ZEW 
Foundation Panel (Germany), the Research on Entrepreneurship in Advanced Technologies 
(RITA) directory and Private Equity Monitor (Italy), the Webriesgo Database (Spain), and the 
Library House (now called Venture Source; the UK). Moreover, data on VC-backed companies 
                                                 
7 The VICO dataset was built through the joint effort of nine universities across Europe with the support of the 7th 
European Framework Program. For more details on the procedures used in the data-gathering process and on all the 
variables included in the database, see Bertoni and Martì (2011). 
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and their investors were cross-checked by a central data processing unit with those available 
from public sources (e.g., websites and annual reports of VC investors, press releases and press 
clippings, and initial public offering prospectuses). Therefore, data in the VICO database are 
more reliable than those available in commercial databases. The non-VC-backed firms were 
included in the VICO database following the same criteria relating to country, age, 
independence, industry, and legal status used for the inclusion of the VC-backed firms, and they 
were randomly extracted (conditional on these criteria) from all available years of Bureau van 
Dijk’s Amadeus database. We resorted to additional information sources to improve the 
coverage of the dataset and assure data reliability (i.e., industry associations and Chamber of 
Commerce directories, commercial firm directories, Zephyr, Creditreform, the ZEW Foundation 
Panel, and the RITA directory). Ventures in the VICO database are observed from their 
foundation date to 2010 (or the time at which they ceased operations or were acquired). 
In February 2010, we sent an online survey to the 5,417 VICO companies for which we had a 
valid email address, to collect information about their demand for external equity. Respondents 
answered “Yes” or “No” to the question “Has your company ever sought equity financing from 
sources other than founders, their family members and friends?” To companies that answered 
“Yes”, we also asked when they actually sought financing. The possible non-exclusive answers 
were “before or at the time of foundation; in the first 2 years after foundation; between the 2nd 
and 5th years after foundation; between the 5th and 10th years after foundation; after the 10th year 
after foundation”.8 We sent four reminders between February and April 2010. To fill in missing 
data and check the reliability of the information provided by sample ventures, we complemented 
the online survey with several phone interviews. Ultimately, we received 814 answers (response 
rate of 15.03%).  
In this paper, we use the data on the 533 ventures for which we have complete information with 
regards to the variables of interest. We populate an unbalanced panel dataset in which we track 
yearly information on these companies in the first 15 years of their lives. We exclude companies 
                                                 
8 To reduce retrospective bias and increase response rates, we decided not to inquire about ventures' seeking 
behavior on a year-by-year basis. That option would have meant administering a much longer survey questionnaire 
with a much higher level of detail, and it would have probably led to less complete and reliable answers from a 
lower number of respondents.  
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that are older than 15 years, as VC financing is typically used in the early stages of 
entrepreneurial ventures’ life. The oldest company was born in 1984 and the youngest in 2004. 
The dataset covers the period from 1984 to 2009, one year before our survey was carried out. 
3.2 Sample descriptive statistics 
Out of the 533 high-tech entrepreneurial ventures in our sample, 251 (47.1%) had actively sought 
external equity financing at some point. Table 1 distinguishes the sample ventures based on 
whether they had ever sought external equity financing, and for each category of ventures, it 
provides a breakdown by industry, country and foundation year. The ² tests shown in the table 
highlight significant differences between external equity seeking and non-seeking ventures by 
country and foundation year classes and nearly significant differences by industry. Ventures 
located in Belgium, the United Kingdom and France are more likely to look for external equity, 
while ventures in Italy and Spain are less inclined to do so. Younger ventures (especially those 
founded between 1997 and 2000) exhibit a higher propensity to seek external equity. Finally, 
ventures in biotech, pharmaceuticals and other R&D services are more likely to look for external 
equity than ventures in other industries. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
In Figure 1, we show the age at which sample companies looked for external equity. To build the 
figure, we excluded VC-backed companies after receipt of the first VC round, as we are not 
interested in companies looking for additional rounds of financing. Therefore, for each age class, 
the figure shows the number of non-VC-backed companies that looked for external equity 
divided by the number of companies that completed the survey and in that age class, had not yet 
received VC. The ventures may have looked for external equity at more than one period in their 
lives. Their propensity to look for external equity peaks in the period between the 3rd and the 5th 
year after founding. Conversely, few ventures did so after the 10th year. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
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3.3 The geographical distribution of VC investments in Europe 
We retrieved information about the geographical distribution of VC investments in Europe from 
the Thomson One database. On 26 February 2016, we downloaded the full list of VC 
investments carried out between 1984 and 2009 by European VC investors (39,083 investments 
in total). Of these investments, we focused on new investments, i.e., investments in which an 
investor financed a company for the first time. As we will explain below, we will use these data 
to measure the availability of VC. We assigned each new investment to a geographical region 
based on the location of the VC investor9. We used the NUTS 2 (Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics) 2010 classification to identify geographical regions.10 The European Union’s 
territory is subdivided into 270 NUTS 2 regions. On average, a NUTS 2 region has an area of 
16,310 km2, equivalent to a spherical radius of 40.67 km (Eurostat, 2011). To assign each VC 
investor to a NUTS 2 region, we first translated the textual information on the ZIP code, city and 
country of the VC headquarters (provided by Thomson One) into numerical information on the 
latitude and longitude coordinates. This geocoding process was automated using Google Maps 
Geocoding API and the R command “geocode”. We then used geographical data on the 
administrative boundaries of each NUTS 2 (retrieved from Eurostat’s website) to link each pair 
of VC coordinates with a NUTS 2 identifier.  
Figure 2 shows the number of new investments by the location of VC investors (at the NUTS 2 
level) over the 1984-2009 period. The Inner London and Île-de-France (Paris) regions stand out; 
they represent 21.3% and 15.7%, respectively, of new investments. The analysis of the location 
of the invested companies and their VC investors shows a strong co-location tendency. During 
the period analysed, 78.1% of invested companies received VC from investors located in the 
                                                 
9 Please note that a single round of investment can be counted more than once according to the number of 
syndicating investors. We considered all new investments made by European VC investors independently of the 
location of portfolio companies (i.e., they may be located in Europe or elsewhere). 
10 The NUTS classification is a single, coherent system for dividing the European Union's territory created by the 
European Commission to produce regional statistics. The NUTS classification is based on three hierarchical levels: 
NUTS1 (major socio-economic regions), NUTS2 (basic regions used by the European Commission for the 
application of regional policies) and NUTS3 (small regions for specific diagnoses). Eurostat set up the NUTS 
classification at the beginning of the 1970s and updated it several times since then according to changes in the 
regional breakdown of countries. In this paper, we use the NUTS 2010 classification introduced on 7 February 2011 
(Commission Regulation (EU) No 31/2011) at the NUTS2 level.  
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same country as the invested company. In 35.2% of cases, they were located in the same NUTS 2 
region. 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
4 Econometric model 
4.1 Dependent variable 
In this section, we describe the econometric model used to test our predictions regarding 
ventures’ demand for external equity. Our dependent variable measures whether the sample 
entrepreneurial ventures looked for external equity in a particular calendar year. To build this 
variable, we used the answers that our 533 sample companies gave to the survey questions on 
whether and when they had ever sought equity finance from sources other than founders, their 
family members and their friends. We constructed a time-varying variable, 𝑉𝐶𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡, which 
takes a value of 1 in all calendar years 𝑡 included in a period in which company 𝑖 looked for 
external equity and 0 otherwise. The variable was defined from one year before foundation to the 
15th year after foundation. As we mentioned earlier, for VC-backed companies, we excluded 
from the sample all years after the receipt of the first VC round. Our observation period goes 
from 1984 (the foundation year of our oldest sample company) to 2009 (one year before the 
survey was administered). In Figure 3a, we plot the yearly percentage of sample firms seeking 
external equity (equal to the mean of the dummy 𝑉𝐶𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 by year). For comparison 
purposes, in Figure 3b we plot the total number of new investments made by European VC 
investors between 1984 and 2009 according to Thomson One. The percentage of companies 
seeking external equity peaks in 2000, a finding that is consistent with the large number of 
investments around the bubble period. This first evidence suggests that the demand for external 
equity has sensitively changed over time and is correlated to the yearly number of investments 
by VC investors. 
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
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4.2 Independent variables: the weighted distance and the radius specifications 
Our independent variables assess the effect of the geographical distance between the locations of 
companies and prospective VC investors on companies’ demand for external equity. To develop 
these variables, we use information from two sources. From Thomson One, we retrieved data on 
the number of new investments by European VC investors and their location. From VICO, we 
use information about the location of sample companies. We use two alternative specifications in 
which we model differently the impact of the distance from the location of prospective VC 
investors: the “weighted distance” specification and the “radius” specification. 
In the “weighted distance” specification, we include three variables capturing the availability of 
VC in the same region of the company, in the same country and abroad: 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡. The 
variable 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is the number of new investments made in the previous three 
years (t-3, t-2 and t-1) by VC investors with headquarters in the same NUTS 2 region as the focal 
company, in logarithm.11 The variables 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, are distance-weighted indexes of the availability of VC outside the 
region but in the same country and outside the country in which the focal company is located, 
respectively. To build these variables, instead of considering the VC availability in all 270 NUTS 
2 regions in Europe, we consider only the regions that ranked among the top 50 in terms of the 
number of VC investments in a three-year window. We call these 50 regions “VC hubs”. 12 
Investments in these 50 hubs represent 87.2% of the total number of investments in Thomson 
One. We consider only the 50 VC hubs to lower the computation burden, assuming that if a focal 
region is the site of limited VC activity, it is unlikely that the number of VC investments in the 
region has any stimulating effect on the demand for external equity of companies located outside 
the region. Our measures of the distance-weighted availability of VC are equal to the weighted 
                                                 
11 We use a 3 year window to stabilize the variable over time. As robustness checks, we performed similar analyses 
using, alternatively, the new investments made in the past 5 years or in the past year only. We also repeated the 
analysis considering, instead of new investments, all investment rounds and first investment rounds only. In all 
cases, we obtained similar results, which are available from the authors upon request. 
12 In the period under examination, the NUTS2 regions that are defined as “VC hubs” are remarkably stable. This is 
especially true in the past decade: 30 regions are defined as VC hubs over the entire period and the other 20 are 
defined as VC hubs over at least 6 years. 
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average of the VC availability in each VC hub except the one in which the focal company is 
located. We use the distance between the hub and the focal company as the weight. Specifically, 
the variables are defined as follows: 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = log ∑
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑙,𝑡
𝛼1
𝑙∈𝐶𝑖,𝑡,𝑙≠𝑘𝑖
 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = log ∑
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑙,𝑡
𝛼2
𝑙∈𝐶𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅,𝑙≠𝑘𝑖
 
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the group of VC hubs within the country in which company 𝑖 is located (excluding 
the region in which the company is located -𝑘𝑖-, if it is a hub) and 𝐶𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  is the group of cross-
border VC hubs (𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∪ 𝐶𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ = 50 𝑉𝐶 ℎ𝑢𝑏𝑠). 𝑙 denotes each of those hubs, 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑡 is the local availability in hub 𝑙 and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 is the distance (in 10 
km) between the centroid of hub 𝑙 and the location of company 𝑖.13 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 are the decay 
factors for distance. We set 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 to the values that maximize the log-likelihood function of 
our econometric model (for a similar approach, see Bonaccorsi et al., 2014). A detailed 
description of the procedure that we used to estimate the decay parameters values is given in the 
Appendix. According to this procedure, the optimal decay parameter values are 1 for 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 (𝛼1) and 0.3 for 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 (𝛼2). Calibrated 
parameters higher than 0 suggest that the greater the distance of a company’s location from a VC 
hub, the lower the allegedly positive effect of the availability of VC in the hub on the company’s 
demand for VC. The fact that 𝛼1 is higher than 𝛼2 indicates that distance discourages the 
demand for VC more within than across national borders. 
The second model specification that we use is the “radius” specification. In this model, we use 
different independent variables to account for the geographic distribution of VC, each capturing 
the availability of VC within a certain radius of distance within and beyond national borders. The 
variable 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑑0_𝑑1_𝑘𝑚𝑖,𝑡, is the log of the number of new investments 
                                                 
13 We identify the centroid of a hub as the average of the positions of the VC investors located in the region, using 
the number of investments as weight.    
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over the previous three years made by VC investors located in regions whose centroid is at a 
distance between 𝑑0 and 𝑑1 kilometres from the focal company and in the same country as the 
focal company. Similarly, 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_𝑑0_𝑑1_𝑘𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the number of new 
investments over the previous three years made by VC investors located in regions whose 
centroid is at a distance between 𝑑0 and 𝑑1 kilometres from the focal company and in a different 
country. We used 0, 50, 250, 500, 1000 and 5000 kilometres as thresholds to balance the need for 
a sufficiently fine-grained measure of distance and the risk of collinearity between those 
variables. The choice of these thresholds is also based on the estimates of the weighted distance 
specification, as we will show below.  
In all specifications, we include our inverse proxy of the level of competition, 
𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 measuring the percentage of new investments made by the top four 
investors in the home region of company 𝑖 in the last 3 years (i.e., the C4 concentration index). 
Finally, we consider an additional model specification that builds on the results of the previous 
two models. We use the radius specification in which we drop variables related to distances 
greater than 500 km and we model the availability of VC beyond national borders with a single 
variable (𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_500_𝑘𝑚) that measures the cross-border availability of 
VC at a distance between 0 and 500 km. Indeed, as we will show below, our results suggest that 
the availability of VC within national borders at distance greater than 500 km has a negligible 
influence on the demand for external equity, and the influence of distance is much weaker across 
borders than within borders. We also drop 𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 which is never significant 
in our models. The resulting “compact specification” is used to provide additional evidence 
about the moderators of the relationship between the demand for external equity and the 
geography of the availability of VC. 
4.3 Controls 
The econometric model includes a set of industry, country and year dummies and a continuous 
variable measuring the age of the focal company in logarithms (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡). For a subset of 
companies, we also have information about the human capital of the founding team, cash 
generation, leverage, capital expenditures and number of patents. Previous literature has 
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identified all these variables as important drivers of companies’ tendency to seek external 
finance (Cosh et al., 2009; Eckhardt et al., 2006; Mina et al., 2013). These variables are used 
here as controls. In the 2010 survey, we asked our sample companies about the human capital of 
their founders. In particular, we asked whether “among the founders of the company there were 
individuals who, before the foundation of the company: i) had previous managerial experience, 
ii) had founded one or more firms, iii) had obtained an MBA or a master degree in Management 
or Economics and iv) had obtained a PhD in technical or scientific disciplines”. We coded the 
answers to these questions with the dummy variables 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖, 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖 and 
𝑃ℎ𝐷_𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, respectively. We measured cash generation and leverage with the variables 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤/𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1, equal to the ratio between cash flow and sales, and 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡/
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1, equal to the ratio between total debt and total assets. We measured capital 
expenditures with 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋/𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1, i.e., the variation of fixed assets with respect to the 
previous year divided by companies’ profits. The accounting data used to compute these ratios 
were retrieved from Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus dataset. The accounting variables were 
winsorized at the 1% level to reduce the influence of outliers. As accounting variables are 
unavailable for a fraction of sample companies, we impute the missing values to 0, and generate 
a dummy variable called 𝑑_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 equal to 1 if the data has been imputed, and 
to 0 otherwise. This variable is meant to capture any change in slope of the accounting variables 
that the arbitrary imputation of the 0 would otherwise generate (for a similar approach, see Dale 
and Krueger, 2002). As a proxy for companies’ innovativeness, we used the variable 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1, which is equal to the cumulative number of patents granted to each 
company, depreciated over time. Granted patents were assigned to the application year, with a 
0.15 knowledge depreciation rate, as is usual in the patent literature (see, e.g., Hall et al., 2005). 
We also control for local conditions via additional variables measured at the NUTS 2 level in 
each year: the logarithm of the GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1), the logarithm of the number of patents 
granted proxying local innovativeness (𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1), the size of the region measured in 
squared kilometres (𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖) and the average ratio of debt to equity of young high-tech 
companies measuring the local availability of alternative sources of finance (𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1). 
The former three variables were retrieved from Eurostat, while the latter was extracted from the 
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VICO database and computed as the average ratio of debt on equity of all VICO companies 
located in a given region. 
Finally, variables at the national level are included. 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 is the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) index lagged by 1 year, i.e., it is a measure of stock market 
performance in each European country. Cumming et al. (2010) find that MSCI returns accelerate 
the VC due diligence process, which may stimulate companies’ demand for external equity. 
Furthermore, Armour and Cumming (2008, 2006) show that bankruptcy laws influence the 
extent to which entrepreneurs take risk, which is likely to also affect the demand for external 
equity. Therefore, we include the dummy variable 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1, which is 
equal to 1 in country-years during which a bankrupt individual can obtain a “fresh start”, 
indicating that bankruptcy law is relatively lenient. Armour and Cumming (2008) provide this 
information for the period 1984-2005. We completed the time series till 2009 using information 
retrieved from the International Insolvency Institute (https://www.iiiglobal.org/). Finally, the 
variable 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1 measures the number of km of railways divided by the 
population in each country-year (source: Eurostat). Such variable accounts for the development 
of the transport infrastructures, which may reduce the costs that entrepreneurs incur in seeking 
external equity.  
A description of all the variables used in our analysis is provided in Table 2, while Table 3 
shows summary statistics and the correlation matrix. Henceforth, for sake of simplicity, we omit 
the index 𝑖, 𝑡 that we used to better explain our variables. However, the reader should note that in 
all models, all variables were lagged 1 year to reduce concerns about endogeneity. 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 around here] 
5 Results 
We use a panel random effects model to estimate the linear probability that company 𝑖 looks for 
external equity in year 𝑡.14 The results of different specifications are reported in Table 4. 
                                                 
14 We preferred the random effects model to the fixed effects model for two reasons. First, a random effects model 
allowed us to better estimate the effect of our independent variables relating to the availability of VC, which are 
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Companies’ age and three sets of dummies capturing industry, country and year effects are 
included in all models. For each specification, we also show a model in which we include 
additional control variables to account for company-specific and location-specific effects. When 
we consider these additional controls, the number of observations decreases because of missing 
values. 
Let us focus on columns 1 and 2, in which we show the results of the weighted distance 
specification, including measures of the local availability of VC (i.e., within the home region of a 
focal company, i.e., 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙) and the distance-weighted availability of VC outside 
of the company’s region but within national borders (𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙), and outside of 
the company’s country (𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑). We also consider the level of competition in 
the local VC market (inversely captured by 𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙). 
As we expected, the local availability of VC has a positive effect on companies’ propensity to 
look for external equity, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient (at the 1% 
confidence level) of 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙. 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 also has a positive and 
significant (at the 1% level) coefficient, while the coefficient of 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 is non-
significant at standard confidence levels. This result highlights that the availability of VC beyond 
national borders does not influence the external equity-seeking behaviour of companies. 
Contrary to our prediction, entrepreneurial ventures’ propensity to seek external equity does not 
appear to be significantly affected by the level of competition in the local VC market. The 
coefficient of 𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 is negative as expected, but not significant. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
To investigate the economic magnitude of the effects illustrated above, let us consider Figure 4. 
Based on the estimates presented in column 2 of Table 4, the figure shows the increase in the 
                                                 
quite stable over time and vary mostly across companies/regions. For example, the between standard deviation of 
the variable VCavailability_local is approximately twice as large as its within standard deviation (1.777 and 0.938, 
respectively). Second, and relatedly, our predictions about the effects of the geography of prospective VC investors 
on the demand for external equity relate more to differences in the availability of VC across regions (between 
differences) than on differences over time within the focal region (within differences). Note, however, that fixed 
effects estimates lead to results (available from the authors upon request) that are very similar to those presented in 
the text. 
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probability that a company seeks external equity triggered by an increase in VC availability. 
Specifically, to measure the magnitude of the effect on the demand for external equity of the 
local availability of VC, we consider an increase in the number of VC investments in the same 
region as the focal company. To measure the magnitude of the effect of the national availability 
of VC and its distance decay, we consider an increase in the number of VC investments in a 
different region from the one of the focal company but in the same country. In both cases we 
consider an increase of 20 VC investments, equal to a change from the 25th (1) to the 75th (21) 
percentile of the number of new investments in a 3 year period over all NUTS 2 regions. The 
shock in local VC availability leads to a 6.0 percentage-point increase in the likelihood that a 
company seeks external equity in a given year.15 Since the unconditional probability of looking 
for external equity in our sample is equal to 19.4% (see Table 3), this increase is sizable. The 
effect of a shock in the availability of VC in the region in which a company is located is always 
greater than that of a similar shock in another region of the same country. An increase of 20 
investments in a VC hub leads to a 3.9 percentage-point increase in the probability that a 
company located 100 km from that hub looks for external equity. The increase shrinks to 1.9 for 
companies located 250 km away, and progressively vanishes at greater distance.  
[Insert Figure 4 around here] 
In columns 3 and 4, we show the results of the radius specification. We find a positive and 
significant coefficient for 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_0_50_𝑘𝑚 (at the 5% level) and for 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_50_250_𝑘𝑚 (at the 5% or 10% level), while variables capturing the 
availability of VC at higher distances or across borders are not significant. In line with the 
evidence from the weighted distance models, we find that companies are significantly more 
inclined to look for external equity if they are located near areas in which VC is more active. 
Prospective VC investors located further than 250 km and those beyond national borders have no 
effect on companies’ demand for external equity, independently of the number of investments 
they make. As in the previous specification, the coefficient of 𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 is 
negative but not significant. 
                                                 
15 This increase is computed as 0.025 (i.e., the coefficient of 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 in column 2 of Table 4) 
multiplied by the shock in local availability (log(21+1)-log(1+1)). 
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Some further tests on the coefficients of model 4 confirm that the coefficients of 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_500_1000_𝑘𝑚 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_1000_5000_𝑘𝑚 are 
jointly insignificant (2(2)=0.42, p-value = 0.8086). Similarly, the coefficients of 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_500_1000_𝑘𝑚 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_1000_5000_𝑘𝑚 are 
jointly insignificant (2(2)=2.46, p-value = 0.2918). Therefore, in columns 5 and 6, we show a 
more compact version of the radius specification in which we drop these insignificant variables. 
We decided not to drop all the variables capturing VC availability across national borders but 
rather to aggregate the variables 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_50_𝑘𝑚, 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_50_250_𝑘𝑚 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_250_500_𝑘𝑚 in a single 
variable: 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_500_𝑘𝑚. This parsimonious specification reflects the fact 
that according to the results of the “weighted distance” specification, geographic distance plays a 
less important role across borders. Results on this specification, shown in columns 5 and 6, 
confirms the previous findings: only the availability of VC within a radius of 250 km and within 
the borders of the country in which a focal company is located influence its demand for external 
equity.  
Let us turn our attention to the control variables. The human capital of the founders positively 
affects companies’ propensity to look for external equity (Eckhardt et al., 2006). Indeed, 
𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 and 𝑀𝐵𝐴 are positively and significantly (at the 5% level) associated with the 
dependent variable in columns 2, 4 and 6. Instead, 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 has negative coefficients in all models 
in which it is included (at the 5% or 10% level), possibly as a result of the greater internal 
financial resources of serial entrepreneurs. Companies with more cash flow are significantly (at 
the 1% level) less likely to look for external equity. This result is in line with the pecking order 
theory, according to which companies prefer to finance new projects with internal cash flows 
without resorting to more expensive external sources of capital (Cosh et al., 2009; Myers, 1984). 
Companies with greater patent stock are more likely to seek external equity (significant at the 
5% or 10% level), a result in contrast with what Mina et al. (2013) found in their sample of UK 
and US firms. With respect to local conditions, we find a positive and significant (at the 5% 
level) effect of the local availability of debt, which proxies for the financial sophistication of the 
region, and of the MSCI index (at the 1% level), capturing the development of financial markets 
at the country level. Similarly, regional GDP has a positive but far less significant coefficient 
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(10% level, only in column 4). Unexpectedly, we find a negative and significant (at the 5% level 
in column 4 and at the 10% level in column 6) coefficient for the logarithm of patents in the 
region. One possible explanation is that more innovative regions may have more comprehensive 
support systems in place for high-tech entrepreneurial ventures, partially compensating for the 
need for external equity. Finally, the older companies in our sample are more likely to seek 
external equity, as age has positive and significant coefficients at the 1% level in columns 2, 4 
and 6. 
6 Robustness checks 
We performed several robustness checks based on the weighted distance specification, which we 
show in Table 5. Robustness checks based on the radius specification are shown in Table A1 in 
the Appendix. Results are similar across the two specifications and consistent with the estimates 
illustrated earlier, with few exceptions (e.g., the lower statistical significance of the 
VC_availability_national_50_250 variable in the radius specification). 
The first concern one could raise is that potential reverse causality between companies’ location 
and demand for external equity may lead to endogeneity issues. A company actively seeking 
external equity may decide to locate closer to prospective VC investors. Previous studies indicate 
that the location of new companies is mainly driven by factors other than the availability of VC. 
Michelacci and Silva (2007) document that entrepreneurs are affected by a local bias, i.e., they 
are inclined to establish their businesses in their home region. Moreover, Dahl and Sorenson 
(2012) find that ventures perform better when they are located in the home region of their 
founders. In high-tech sectors, the location of newly created ventures is largely explained by the 
geographical distribution of skilled human capital (e.g., talented inventors) rather than by the 
geography of VC. For example, studies on biotech start-ups (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; 
Zucker et al., 1998) show that in most cases, U.S. university scientists located their newly 
created biotech ventures in the region where the university with which they were affiliated was 
located. Still, Stuart and Sorenson (2003) find that that the concentration of VC investors in a 
region positively influences the founding rates of US-based biotech ventures, but the effect is 
much weaker in magnitude and significance than the effects of the concentration of universities 
or the concentration of other biotech firms. Lastly, Bertoni et al. (2018) confirm the local bias of 
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Italian entrepreneurs and document that relocation from the home region is very rare and not 
driven by the availability of VC.  
We conduct a robustness check to assess the effect on our estimates of the potential reverse 
causality between entrepreneurial ventures’ location choices and demand for VC. One can 
assume that companies that did not look for external equity at or before their founding are 
unlikely to have selected their initial location based on the availability of VC. Therefore, we re-
estimated the model excluding companies that indicated in the survey questionnaire that they had 
looked for external equity at or before their founding. To balance the sample, we also excluded 
observations at foundation for companies that did not seek external equity, obtaining a sample of 
329 companies. The results are reported in column 1 of Table 5. Both 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 and 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 still have positive and significant coefficients (at the 5% level), 
suggesting that reverse causality between initial location and demand for external equity does not 
drive our results.  
Furthermore, we investigate whether companies re-locate after foundation to increase their 
probability of success in seeking VC. To tackle this issue, we study a sample of 332 companies 
included in the VICO database and founded in 2003 or 2004 for which we were able to track the 
location between foundation and 2009. Information on location at foundation and location in 
2009 was retrieved using historical versions of the Orbis database (the database traces 
companies’ locations since 2003). Ninety companies out of 332 (27.1%) relocated between 
foundation and 2009. We first test whether the geographical distribution of prospective VC 
investors influences the probability of relocating. We find that 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 and 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙, measured in the location at foundation, are not significantly different 
for the companies that relocated with respect to other companies (t-test=0.5481, p-value=0.5840 
for 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙; t-test=0.6506, p-value=0.5222 for 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙). These 
results suggest that companies located in regions with less VC or that are more distant from VC 
hubs are not more likely to relocate than other companies. We then focus on companies that 
relocated in the first years of their lives and compared the local and national availability of VC in 
the initial and final locations. We find that companies do not relocate in regions where there is 
greater availability VC. Indeed, the local and national availabilities of VC in the new location are 
significantly lower than those in the initial location (𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 and 
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𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 decrease by 39.6% and 40.3%, respectively, with both differences 
being significant at the 1% level). Rental prices, which are cheaper in non-metropolitan areas 
(i.e., outside VC hubs), may explain our results and are a more important driver of relocation 
than the availability of VC at close distance. Finally, we tested whether relocating has an impact 
on the probability of receiving VC, finding that it is not the case: the share of companies that 
obtain VC is the same for companies that relocated as for companies that did not (t-test= -0.3709, 
p-value= 0.7109). These results confirm that at least in the period and geographical regions under 
analysis, relocation to VC hubs is not a strong source of reverse causality between the local 
availability of VC and companies’ demand for VC, and does not threaten the validity of our 
results. 
A second concern may be that our sample contains companies that did not look for external 
equity simply because they were unlikely to receive VC, for instance, because of their limited 
quality or growth orientation, regardless of their location. We believe that in our sample this 
issue is limited, as the VICO database was created with the specific objective of including 
companies that potentially would be a target for VC investment (e.g., based on their industry, age 
and size), independently of whether or not they obtained VC (Bertoni and Martí, 2011). 
Moreover, we include an ample set of company-specific controls, including human capital 
variables that should account for the quality of the business. Nevertheless, we conduct several 
robustness checks to ensure that companies that would not be suitable candidates for a VC 
investment are not affecting our results.  
First, we replicate the analysis excluding 106 companies that did not seek external equity 
because they did not need any external financing (self-reported information collected in the 
survey in 2010). These companies might be less growth-oriented than other sample companies. 
This is a conservative approach because arguably, these companies might have chosen a business 
model compatible with absence of VC due to the geographic distance from prospective VC 
investors. Results reported in column 2 are unaffected by the exclusion of these companies.  
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Second, we replicate our analysis on a sample of companies with similar estimated probabilities 
of receiving VC.16 We build the sample by matching VC-backed companies with non-VC-
backed twins. This approach is in line with the suggestion of Ho et al. (2007) to use matching as 
a pre-processing technique to reduce the potential for confounding bias. We first compute the 
probability that a company is actually financed by VC investors, i.e., the propensity score. 
Specifically, we use all company-year observations for non-VC-backed companies and the 
company-year observations in the year of receipt of the first VC round for VC-backed 
companies. In this sample, we estimate a probit model with age, industry and year dummy 
variables (whose values are non-missing for all company-year observations) and predict the 
estimated probability of receiving VC. Then, we use the propensity score to match each VC-
backed company in the year of receipt of VC with one non-VC-backed company with a similar 
probability of obtaining VC. One-to-one matching is done without replacement; i.e., a non-VC-
backed company is not eligible to be matched more than once. We restrict the matched sample 
imposing the company-year observations to be in the common support; i.e., we drop observations 
whose estimated propensity score is higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum 
propensity score of VC-backed companies. This matching approach allows us to reduce 
uncontrolled heterogeneity in our sample. We ended with 158 VC-backed companies and 158 
non-VC-backed twins. Finally, we include in the analysis all observations of VC-backed 
companies and their matched twins until the year of the matching, and we exclude observations 
after that year. We check that our matched sample has acceptable balancing properties by 
graphing the distribution of the pre- and post-matching propensity scores. The results of the 
models estimated using the matched sample are reported in column 3. The number of 
observations drops because of missing values in the control variables. The effects of the 
availability of VC are similar to those illustrated above.  
Third, we discard all VC-backed companies and repeat the estimates on a sample composed only 
of companies that did not obtain VC. This sample is likely to be more homogeneous than the 
                                                 
16 An even more conservative approach to select a sample of companies attractive to VC investors would be to 
discard all companies that did not receive VC and focus only on those that did. Unfortunately, this robustness check 
is not feasible because of the severe drop in observations when considering VC-backed companies only.  
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initial sample in terms of companies’ attractiveness to VC investors. Results are shown in 
column 4 of Table 5 and are once again robust, indicating that our results on the association 
between the geography of VC and companies’ demand for external equity are not driven by 
companies that successfully obtained VC.  
As a third robustness check, we acknowledge that the survey-based nature of our study 
potentially creates non-respondent bias concerns. Respondents may be systematically different 
from non-respondents, and this might have an impact on our results. To tackle this issue, we use 
a Heckman approach to account for any response bias that can emerge from the data. Based on a 
dataset including all companies in the VICO database to which the 2010 survey was 
administered, we estimate a probit model whose dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for 
respondents and 0 for non-respondents. We use as regressors companies’ age in 2010, country 
and industry dummies, and a dummy equal to 1 for VC-backed companies and 0 for companies 
that were not VC-backed at the time of the survey. We use the results of the probit model to 
predict the probability of responding to the survey. Finally, we include the Inverse Mills Ratio 
calculated from the estimates of the selection equation in the main analysis to control for 
response bias (Heckman, 1979). We also bootstrapped to obtain reliable standard errors. The 
significant (and negative) coefficient of the IMR suggests that unobserved factors that are 
positively associated with the probability that companies will respond to the survey (resulting in 
a negative IMR) are positively associated with the probability that they will seek external equity. 
Our results related to the main independent variables remain unchanged (column 5 in Table 5), 
confirming that we can exclude the possibility that response bias is driving our results.  
Our fourth robustness check relates to the fact that our observation period includes the years of 
the so-called Internet bubble (i.e. years 2000 and 2001). According to the data we showed 
earlier, both the number of VC investments and the propensity of sample companies to look for 
external equity peaked in this period. One may wonder whether our results are driven by 
companies’ external equity seeking behaviour during the Internet bubble period. For this 
purpose, we rerun our estimates after dropping all observations relating to the years 2000 and 
2001. As shown in column 6 of Table 5, results remain almost unchanged. 
29 
 
Our last robustness check is motivated by the fact that we define VC availability based on the 
headquarters of the VC firms, as reported by Thomson One. However, many VC firms are multi-
office, with branches located in several regions and even countries. This may create distortions in 
our VC availability variables, as we may have allocated some investments to the wrong location. 
Unfortunately, we do not have information about which VC firms have multiple offices, and 
therefore we cannot check whether our results hold once we exclude these VC firms from the 
analysis. Therefore, we use an alternative approach and define VC availability not based on the 
location of the VC firms but based on the location of the target companies. Results based on this 
alternative approach are shown in column 7 of Table 5 and are similar to those illustrated 
earlier.17 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
7 Additional analysis 
In this section we investigate the effects of several moderators of the relationship between the 
geography of prospective VC investors and companies’ demand for external equity. We focus on 
the ownership and governance of VC investors and their reputation and on the institutional and 
cultural distance between the country of the focal company and those of VC investors. For this 
analysis, we use the compact radius specification. Indeed, the need to simultaneously calibrate 
several distance parameters makes the use of the “weighted distance” specification not viable, 
because of the high computational burden and the possible presence of several local optimal 
points. Moreover, because of multicollinearity problems, we are forced to reduce the number of 
regressors and use the compact version of the radius specification, in which we introduce the 
different moderators in the estimates one by one.  
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 around here] 
                                                 
17 Notwithstanding the issue related to the location of the headquarter, we believe that the variables used in the main 
analysis, based on the location of prospective VC investors, are better in capturing costs and benefits associated with 
VC investment (which ultimately depend on the geographic distance of entrepreneurial ventures from prospective 
VC investors, not their portfolio companies). Moreover, to entrepreneurs considering external equity financing, the 
location of the portfolio companies may be less evident than the location of VC investors. 
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For what concerns VC ownership, we separately consider independent VC (IVC) investors and 
governmental VC (GVC investors). In Europe, IVC and GVC investors are more active than 
other investor types such as corporate and bank-affiliated VC investors (Bertoni et al., 2015). 
Moreover, for these two latter types of VC investors, the problem generated by the assignment of 
VC investments to the location of their headquarters is even more serious than for other VC 
types, because they are affiliated to companies and banks that may have multiple branches in 
different countries. Therefore, we excluded them from this analysis. For IVC, we generate the 
variables 𝐼𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_0_50_𝑘𝑚, 𝐼𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_50_250_𝑘𝑚 and 
𝐼𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_250_500_𝑘𝑚 which measure the log of the number of new 
investments made by IVC investors located between 0 and 50, 50 and 250, 250 and 500 
kilometres, respectively, from the focal company, but in the same country as the company. 
Similarly, 𝐼𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_500_𝑘𝑚 is the log of the number of new investments 
made by IVC investors located between 0 and 500 km from the focal company and in different 
countries. In the same way, we generate 𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_0_50_𝑘𝑚, 
𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_50_250_𝑘𝑚, 𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_250_500_𝑘𝑚 and 
𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_500_𝑘𝑚 for GVC investors. 
Regarding VC reputation, we take inspiration from Nahata’s (2008) measure of reputation based 
on the focal VC investor’s share of aggregate investments in the VC industry. For each VC firm, 
we cumulate the number of investments from the beginning of year 1980 to the focal calendar 
year and normalize it by the overall aggregate number of investments in the VC industry until 
that year.18 We then generate a set of variables reflecting the activism of more reputed VC 
investors, i.e., those whose reputation in a given year is in the last quartile of the distribution, and 
a similar set for other VC investors. Specifically, the variables are 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑝_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_0_50_𝑘𝑚, 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑝_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_50_250_𝑘𝑚, 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑝_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_250_500_𝑘𝑚 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑝_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_500_𝑘𝑚 for 
more reputed VC investors, and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑝_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_0_50_𝑘𝑚, 
                                                 
18 Nahata (2008) uses the invested amount to compute the reputation measure, while we use the number of 
investments, as in our data there are too may missing values in the investment amounts. 
31 
 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑝_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_50_250_𝑘𝑚, 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑝_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_250_500_𝑘𝑚 and 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑝_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_500_𝑘𝑚 for less reputed VC investors. 
Results of these additional analyses are shown in Table 6. In column 1, we focus on IVC 
investors, finding results that are virtually identical to those of the entire sample: the availability 
of IVC within national borders and located at distances lower than 250 km boost the demand for 
external equity (effects are significant at the 5% level). Instead, our results in column 2 reveal 
that for GVC, distance matters more: only GVC investors located within a radius of 50 km 
influence the demand for external equity (significant at the 1% level).  
In columns 3 and 4, we split VC investors according to their reputation. For investors with lower 
reputation (column 3) the general results hold: only the national availability of VC within a 
radius of less than 250 km has a positive effect on the demand for external equity (with 
significances ranging from 1% to 5%). For more reputed VC investors (column 4), these effects 
though positive, are not significant, possibly as a result of the greater concentration of these 
investors in a few hubs.19 Interestingly, for these investors, we find a positive effect of the cross-
border availability of VC: 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑝_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_500_𝑘𝑚 has a positive and significant 
coefficient at the 5% level. An increase of 20 new investments outside of the country and within 
500km from the location of a focal company leads to a 3.2 percentage-point increase in the 
probability that the company under consideration will look for external equity (an increase of 
almost one sixth of the unconditional probability). 
Finally, we study how cultural and institutional distance between the country of the focal 
company and the one of prospective VC investors affects the demand for external equity and its 
relationship with geographical distance. We replace 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_500_𝑘𝑚 with 
measures capturing the VC availability abroad in countries that are culturally far from or close to 
the country of the focal company. 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑟_0_500_𝑘𝑚 and 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒_0_500_𝑘𝑚  are equal to the log of the number of new investments made 
by VC investors located between 0 and 500 kilometres from the focal company and in a country 
                                                 
19 More than 50 percent of the investments of more reputed VC investors are concentrated in the London areas and 
almost 80 percent are concentrated in four VC hubs.  
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that is culturally far and close, respectively, from the country of the focal company. We measure 
cultural distance based on Drogendijk and Slangen (2006). For all countries, we retrieve the 4 
dimensions of cultural distance originally identified by Hofstede: power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism and masculinity. Then, we compute an overall measure of cultural 
distance as follows: 
𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐,𝑔 =
1
4
∑
(𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐
𝑑 − 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑔
𝑑)
2
𝑆𝐷(𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑)
4
𝑑=1
  
where 𝑑 is one of the four dimensions of cultural distance, 𝑐 is the country of the focal company 
and 𝑔 is the country of the prospective VC investor. SD is the standard deviation of the 
dimensions across countries. We consider as “culturally far” those pairs of countries for which 
the cultural distance is higher than the first quartile and as “culturally close” the other pairs of 
countries.  
Similarly, we study the effect of institutional distance on the relationship between availability of 
VC and demand for external equity. For each country, we retrieve information from the World 
Governance Index database (Mastruzzi et al., 2007) on six indexes capturing different 
institutional dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Similarly to Li and Zahra (2012), we 
compute the level of formal institutional development in each country with a principal 
component analysis on the six indexes. The principal components analysis indicates that the first 
component accounts for 85.14% of the total variance and is calculated as Institutional 
Development = [Voice Accountability × 0.3904 + Political Stability × 0.3643 + Government 
effectiveness × 0.4245 + Regulatory Quality × 0.4132 + Rule of law × 0.4312 + Control of 
corruption × 0.4218]. Next, we compute the absolute difference between the value of 
Institutional development of the country of the focal company and that of the country of 
prospective VC investors and consider as “institutionally far” the pairs of counties for which this 
difference is higher than the first quartile. Finally, we replace the variable 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_0_500_𝑘𝑚 alternatively with 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑟_0_500_𝑘𝑚 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒_0_500_𝑘𝑚. These 
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variables consider VC availability in countries that are institutionally far from and close to that 
of the focal company, respectively. 
Results on how cultural and institutional differences moderate the relationship between demand 
for external equity and VC availability are presented in Table 7. In all models, results on the 
availability of VC within national borders are consistent with those of the main analysis (with a 
somehow lower significance for the variable 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_50_250_𝑘𝑚). However, 
columns 2 and 4 show that when cultural and institutional distances are low, the availability of 
VC beyond national borders influences the demand for external equity. 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒_0_500_𝑘𝑚 in column 2 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒_0_500_𝑘𝑚 in 
column 4 are indeed significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. In terms of magnitude, 
the effect is comparable to the one of the VC investments within national borders. 
8 Discussion and conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to assess how the location of entrepreneurial ventures and of 
prospective VC investors influence ventures’ propensity to look for external equity. For this 
purpose, we have examined the external equity-seeking behaviour of a sample of 533 European 
high-tech entrepreneurial ventures, which we observe during their first 15 years of existence in 
an unbalanced panel covering a 25-year period (1984-2009). Our results indicate that the positive 
effect of the availability of VC on ventures’ propensity to look for external equity decreases with 
geographical distance from prospective VC investors and becomes negligible at a distance 
greater than 250 km. It is also negligible when crossing national borders, independently of 
geographic distance. Moreover, we show that the distance decay of the stimulating effect of the 
availability of VC on the demand for external equity depends on the ownership and governance 
of VC investors and their reputation. The positive effect operates at longer distance for IVC 
investors (up to 250 km) than for GVC investors (up to 50 km). Moreover, highly reputed 
investors, contrary to other investors, can spur demand for external equity even in companies 
located in other countries (in a radius of 500 km from their premises). Our findings also suggest 
that national borders represent a less powerful barrier for the demand for external equity when 
entrepreneurs and prospective VC investors are located in countries at close cultural and 
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institutional distance. Finally, we find that ventures’ external equity-seeking behaviour is not 
significantly affected by the level of competition in the local VC market.  
These results make several original contributions to the literature. In recent years, the 
entrepreneurial finance literature has devoted considerable attention to the “geography of VC”, 
i.e., the spatial distribution of VC investments. The uneven distribution of VC investments is 
typically attributed to supply-side factors, such as the strong geographic concentration of VC 
investors and their inclination to invest locally (Chen et al., 2010; Cumming and Dai, 2010; 
Lindgaard Christensen, 2007; Mason and Harrison, 2002; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). We 
contribute to this literature by arguing and empirically documenting that the uneven distribution 
of VC investors strongly influences the demand side of the VC market (for a similar claim, see 
Bertoni et al., 2016; Mason and Harrison, 2002). Our results are in accordance with the view that 
entrepreneurs located at longer distance from prospective VC investors anticipate higher costs 
and lower benefits associated with obtaining VC. This reduces their inclination to seek external 
equity. We show that like VC investors, entrepreneurs exhibit a local bias and prefer to raise 
equity from investors located nearby. VC investors tend to follow the “20-minutes rule”, 
according to which if a start-up company is not within a 20-minute drive of their offices, it will 
not be funded (Cumming and Dai, 2010). Entrepreneurs’ local bias seems to be weaker: 
entrepreneurs’ demand for external equity is influenced by prospective VC investors located up 
to 250 km away. Moreover, the strength of the local bias of entrepreneurs depends on the 
characteristics of prospective VC investors. Our results suggest that entrepreneurs correctly 
anticipate the differential benefits and costs of different types of investors. Previous studies show 
that investments by governmental VC investors have a more limited positive impact on portfolio 
companies than those of private VC investors (Alperovych et al., 2015; Bertoni and Tykvová, 
2015; Brander et al., 2015; Cumming et al., 2017; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014). Accordingly, the 
positive stimulus of the availability of VC on entrepreneurs’ demand for external equity vanishes 
at shorter distance when prospective VC investors are government-owned. As to more reputed 
VC investors, our results are less clear-cut. Nevertheless, the finding that the presence of reputed 
VC investors influences the demand for external equity of companies located abroad is in line 
with previous studies that highlight the greater benefits of backing by reputed VC investors (Hsu, 
2004; Nahata, 2008; Sørensen, 2007). These results contribute to the vast and scattered literature 
that studies the heterogeneity of VC investors (for a review, see Da Rin et al., 2013). 
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We also add to the literature on cross-border VC investments. This literature highlights the 
benefits entrepreneurial ventures can reap from partnering with international VC investors, who 
may offer them access to their local product market and better exit opportunities (Bertoni and 
Groh, 2014; Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). However, international VC investments may imply 
substantial costs for entrepreneurial ventures, because of the cultural and institutional differences 
between the ventures and the investors’ countries (Cumming and Macintosh, 2003; Wright et al., 
2005). In line with this view, we show that the availability of VC beyond ventures’ national 
borders does not have any stimulating effect on ventures’ propensity to look for external equity, 
unless VC investors are located in countries at close institutional and cultural distance from the 
country of the venture. Highly reputed VC investors, for which the anticipated benefits are 
arguably higher, represent an exception, as mentioned above. 
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the external finance-seeking behaviour of 
entrepreneurial ventures, focussing on the search for external equity. Consistent with the 
“pecking order” hypothesis (Myers, 1984), the literature has shown that entrepreneurial ventures 
are often reluctant to look for external equity (Cosh et al., 2009). Still, a flourishing demand for 
external equity is fundamental for the development of a “thick”, efficient and developed VC 
industry (Bertoni et al., 2018). Therefore, the investigation of factors that make entrepreneurial 
ventures more or less inclined to look for external equity is of paramount importance. Even after 
controlling for several company-specific factors highlighted by previous studies (Cosh et al., 
2009; Eckhardt et al., 2006; Mina et al., 2013), our findings reveal that entrepreneurial ventures’ 
demand for external equity is strongly influenced by their geographical location and notably their 
distance from prospective VC investors, a factor that so far has remained almost unexplored (for 
a partial exception, see Bertoni et al., 2018). 
As with any study, ours has some limitations that open new directions for future research. First, 
by aggregating the number of VC investments based on their distance from the focal company, 
we lose granularity of information on the territorial density of VC investors. In particular, we are 
not able to assess whether there is a minimum size for VC hubs to spur demand, or whether on 
the contrary there are saturation effects over a certain size threshold. Second, although we show 
that the distance from prospective VC investors influences the demand for external equity of 
entrepreneurial ventures, we do not know how far entrepreneurial ventures actually sought 
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external equity and from which investors. Obtaining this information would allow to develop a 
more comprehensive understanding of the demand for VC financing. Third, our study fails to 
detect any stimulating effect on ventures’ external equity-seeking behaviour of the level of 
competition in local VC markets. Following a consolidated tradition in the industrial 
organization literature, we inversely proxy the level of competition with industry concentration. 
More precise measures of the level of competition are probably needed to fully grasp its effects 
on ventures’ demand for external equity. For example, our measure does not consider 
syndication, which may attenuate the competition between VC investors. Hence, more work is 
needed for a better understanding of this important issue. Fourth, we assumed that the effect of 
geographical distance on companies’ demand for external equity was stable over the 25-year 
period considered in this study. However, the rapid development of information and 
communication technologies may have led to a reduction in the importance of the physical 
proximity between prospective VC investors and entrepreneurs in inducing the latter to seek 
external equity. It would be interesting to assess how the advanced telecommunications 
infrastructure moderates the effect of geographical distance on entrepreneurs’ demand for VC. In 
order to do so, more recent data on the demand for external equity would be needed. Such data 
would also allow us to consider the effects of the recent trends in VC financing. According to 
Kenney and Zysman (2018), the VC ecosystem has profoundly changed in recent years, 
especially in the US. In particular, equity supply has increased both in amount and sources, in 
parallel with a surge in the number of new ventures, especially platform-based start-ups. These 
phenomena are likely to have changed both the cost of obtaining equity and the need for capital 
for new ventures, and in turn the demand for external equity.  
Despite the limitations above, our study provides novel results that have important policy 
implications. By showing that geographical distance from prospective VC investors discourages 
entrepreneurs’ search for VC, we bring to the fore the issue of how to spur demand for VC of 
promising ventures located in peripheral areas. Here, we highlight two possible policy 
approaches to tackle this issue. 
The first approach involves the supply-side, i.e., VC investors themselves. Our results suggest 
that a more widespread distribution of VC investors across Europe would stimulate the demand 
for external equity (and VC) of European ventures. Our findings indicate that VC hubs spur 
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demand for external equity in a radius of 250 km. Envisaging the creation of enough VC hubs to 
stimulate the demand for external equity from promising ventures across Europe, regardless of 
their location, is a very ambitious policy. Still, the French government took successful steps in 
this direction. In recent years, BPIfrance (www.bpifrance.fr), the French governmental program 
supporting entrepreneurial ventures, has favoured the creation of medium sized VC hubs outside 
the Paris area, e.g., around Lyon, Grenoble, Montpellier, Toulouse and Marseille. 20  
The alternative “demand-side” policy approach would be to make entrepreneurs less reluctant to 
seek external equity at long distance and across national borders. For this purpose, it is important 
to diffuse information and increase the awareness of entrepreneurs about the benefits of external 
equity finance for the development of their businesses. The Finance & Business Programme in 
North East England is a good example of such “investment readiness” initiatives (Mason and 
Harrison, 2001; Mason and Kwok, 2010). 
Another politically sensitive result of this paper is that national borders represent a barrier to the 
demand for VC (except in the case of very reputable VC investors), but that cultural and 
institutional proximity alleviates this barrier. This result confirms the detrimental effects of the 
national fragmentation of the European VC market on ventures’ demand for external equity. As 
cultural traits are difficult to change, policy makers should concentrate effort on reducing the 
institutional distance across European countries. In recent years, the European Commission has 
taken several steps to overcome national barriers to cross-border VC flows, most notably through 
the introduction of the VC passport (European Parliament, 2013). Our study indicates that these 
developments are steps in the right direction. A replication of our analysis with more recent data 
would allow to assess the alleged positive effects of these regulatory changes on the creation of a 
unified European VC market. 
  
                                                 
20 See http://www.lafrenchtech.com/carte. See also https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2018/01/18/the-french-government-experiments-with-venture-capitalism, accessed on 22 October 2018. 
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Appendix: calibration of the distance decay parameters 
In this section, we describe the procedure followed to identify the calibrated values for the 
distance decay parameters, 𝛼, used to compute the variables 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 and 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑. 
We computed different versions of 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 (depending on 𝛼1) and 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 (depending on 𝛼2), using values for 𝛼1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼2 ranging from 0.1 to 2 
and in increments of 0.1. We let both 𝛼 parameters vary simultaneously, creating a matrix for the 
combinations of 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑. For each 
combination, we performed a likelihood ratio (LR) test as follows: LR = -2[log-likelihood 
(unrestricted model) - log-likelihood (restricted model)]. We picked the values of 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 that 
maximize the LR test. The unrestricted model is similar to the model shown in column 2 of 
Table 4, in which 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 are computed using 
the different values of 𝛼1 and 𝛼2. Conversely, in the restricted model, both the variable 
𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 are excluded from the list of regressors. 
The results of the calibration procedure are shown in Figure A1. The values that maximize the 
LR test’s ²(2) (red area) are 1 and 0.3 for 𝛼1 and 𝛼2, respectively. We used those parameters to 
compute the variables 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 and 𝑉𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 used in our 
analysis. 
[Insert Figure A1 around here] 
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Tables & figures
Table 1: Number of sample ventures seeking external equity: break down by industry, country,
foundation year and receipt of VC
Not seeking ext. equity Seeking ext. equity Total
No. Col % Row
%
No. Col % Row
%
No. Col % Row
%
Industry
Biotech, Pharma, Other R&D 48 17.02 44.44 60 23.90 55.56 108 20.26 100.00
ICT manufacturing 60 21.28 55.56 48 19.12 44.44 108 20.26 100.00
Internet & Multimedia 17 6.03 56.67 13 5.18 43.33 30 5.63 100.00
Other Manufacturing 24 8.51 68.57 11 4.38 31.43 35 6.57 100.00
Software 126 44.68 54.08 107 42.63 45.92 233 43.71 100.00
Telecommunications 7 2.48 36.84 12 4.78 63.16 19 3.56 100.00
Total 282 100.00 52.91 251 100.00 47.09 533 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2(5) = 9.1216 Pr = 0.104
Country
Belgium 20 7.09 38.46 32 12.75 61.54 52 9.76 100.00
Finland 38 13.48 51.35 36 14.34 48.65 74 13.88 100.00
France 38 13.48 43.68 49 19.52 56.32 87 16.32 100.00
Germany 17 6.03 56.67 13 5.18 43.33 30 5.63 100.00
Italy 66 23.40 68.04 31 12.35 31.96 97 18.20 100.00
Spain 74 26.24 60.16 49 19.52 39.84 123 23.08 100.00
United Kingdom 29 10.28 41.43 41 16.33 58.57 70 13.13 100.00
Total 282 100.00 52.91 251 100.00 47.09 533 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2(6) = 22.7888 Pr = 0.001
Foundation year classes
1984-1988 38 13.48 66.67 19 7.57 33.33 57 10.69 100.00
1989-1992 39 13.83 65.00 21 8.37 35.00 60 11.26 100.00
1993-1996 42 14.89 50.00 42 16.73 50.00 84 15.76 100.00
1997-2000 80 28.37 45.71 95 37.85 54.29 175 32.83 100.00
2001-2004 83 29.43 52.87 74 29.48 47.13 157 29.46 100.00
Total 282 100.00 52.91 251 100.00 47.09 533 100.00 100.00
Pearson chi2(4) = 11.7718 Pr = 0.019
Legend: “Other R&D” includes R&D and engineering services, “ICT manufacturing” refers to electronic
components, computers, telecommunication equipment, electronic, medical and optical instruments while
“Other manufacturing” includes aerospace, robotics and automation equipment.
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Table 2: Variables description
Variable Description Data source(s)
1 V Cseekingi,t Dummy equal to 1 in the year when the venture looked for external equity. To build this
variable we combined the questions Has your company ever sought equity financing from
sources other than founders, their family members and friends? and the question about the
period of the venture’s life during which it sought external equity.
VICO survey
2 V Cavailability locali,t−1 Logarithm of the sum of the number of investments made by VC investors headquartered
in the region of venture i in the time period (t − 3) to t − 1. Only “new” investments are
considered, i.e., investments in which the VC investor financed a venture for the first time.
authors’
elaboration
based on
Thomson One
3 V Cavailability nationali,t−1 A distance-weighted index of availability of VC investments outside the region where the
venture i is located but in the same country. It is calculated as:
log
∑
l∈Ci,t−1,l 6=ki
(distance−αi,l,t−1 ∗ V Cavailability locali,t−1)
Ci,t−1 is the group of VC hubs of the country where the venture is located, l denotes each
of those VC hubs, distancei,l,t−1 is the distance (in 10km) between venture’s i location and
the centroid of the VC hub l (excluding the region where the venture is located -ki-, if it is
a hub) and α is a decay factor for distance.
authors’
elaboration
based on
Thomson One
and
GoogleMaps
4 V Cavailability abroadi,t−1 A distance-weighted index of availability of VC investments outside the country where the
venture i is located. It is calculated as:
log
∑
l∈Ci,t−1,l 6=ki
(distance−αi,l,t−1 ∗ V Cavailability locali,t−1)
Ci,t−1 is the group of VC hubs outside of the country where the venture i is located, l denotes
each of those hubs, distancei,l,t−1 is the distance (in 10km) between venture’s i location and
the centroid of the hub l and α is a decay factor for distance.
authors’
elaboration
based on
Thomson One
and
GoogleMaps
5 V Cavailability national a-
b kmi,t−1
Logarithm of the sum of the number of investments in the time period (t−3) to t−1 made by
VC investors headquartered in the same country of the venture i and within a radius going
from a km to b km far from where the venture i is located.
authors’
elaboration
based on
Thomson One
and
GoogleMaps
6 V Cavailability abroad a-
b kmi,t−1
Logarithm of the sum of the number of investments in the time period (t− 3) to t− 1 made
by VC investors headquartered outside of the country of the venture i and within a radius
going from a km to b km far from where the venture i is located.
authors’
elaboration
based on
Thomson One
and
GoogleMaps
7 V Cconcentration locali,t−1 Concentration of new investments made by VC investors headquartered in the region of
venture i in the time period (t − 3) up to t − 1. It is measured by the C4 index, i.e., the
percentage of investments made by the top 4 VC investors in the time period (t− 3) to t− 1.
authors’
elaboration
based on
Thomson One
8 agei,t Logarithm of venture’s age
9 manageri Dummy equal to 1 if among the group of founders of the venture there were one or more
individuals who had managerial experience before founding the venture
VICO survey
10 seriali Dummy equal to 1 if among the group of founders of the venture there were one or more
individuals who had founded one or more other firms before founding the focal venture, i.e.
there was a serial entrepreneur(s)
VICO survey
11 MBAi Dummy equal to 1 if among the group of founders of the venture there were one or more
individuals who had obtained an MBA or a master degree in Economics before founding the
venture
VICO survey
12 PhD sciencei Dummy equal to 1 if among the group of founders of the venture there were one or more
individuals who had obtained a PhD in technical or scientific disciplines before founding the
venture
VICO survey
13 cashflow/salesi,t−1 Ratio between cash flow and sales, computed in the year t− 1 VICO dataset
14 debt/totalassetsi,t−1 Ratio between total debt and total assets, computed in the year t− 1 VICO dataset
15 CAPEX/assetsi,t−1 Ratio between capital expenditures and total assets, computed in the year t− 1 VICO dataset
16 patent stocki,t−1 Depreciated number of granted patents. Granted patents are assigned to the application
year. We use a 0.15 knowledge depreciation rate.
VICO dataset
17 totalassetsi,t−1 Total assets in the year t− 1 VICO dataset
18 d accounting missingi,t−1 Dummy equal to 1 one the accounting information were missing VICO dataset
19 debt localk,t−1 Average of debt to equity ratio for high-tech entrepreneurial ventures located in the region k
(NUTS2) of venture i in the year t− 1
VICO dataset
20 patents localk,t−1 Logarithm of the number of patents in the region k (NUTS2) of venture i in the year t− 1 Eurostat
21 GDP localk,t−1 Logarithm of the GDP in the region k (NUTS2) of venture i in the year t− 1 Eurostat
22 area localk,t−1 Area of the region k (NUTS2) where the company is located (km2) Eurostat
23 MSCI nationalc,t−1 MSCI index measured at the national level. The Morgan Stanley Capital International index
is a measurement of stock market performance in a particular area.
Morgan
Stanley
24 bankruptcylaws nationalc,t−1 Variable accounting for changes in bankruptcy laws. Specifically, following Armour and Cum-
ming (2004, 2008), the dummy is equal to 1 for country c in the years in which there is a
“time to discharge in bankruptcy”, i.e., there is a given number of years before a bankrupt
individual would obtain a ”fresh start”. Armour and Cumming (2004) provide such informa-
tion for the period 1984-2005. We have completed the time series till 2009 using information
retrieved from the International Insolvency Institute (https://www.iiiglobal.org/)
Armour and
Cumming
(2004, 2008);
International
Insolvency
Institute
25 infrastructures nationalc,t−1 Variable accounting for the development of the transport infrastructures. It is computed ad
the number of km of railways divided by the population.
Eurostat
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Table 4: Seeking external equity: panel random-effects models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VCavailability local 0.014∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009)
VCavailability national (α=1) 0.051∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.016)
VCavailability abroad (α=0.3) 0.026 -0.011
(0.060) (0.114)
VCavailability national 0-50 km 0.013∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
VCavailability national 50-250 km 0.015∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
VCavailability national 250-500 km -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
VCavailability national 500-1000 km 0.008 0.004
(0.005) (0.007)
VCavailability national 1000-5000 km -0.014 -0.012
(0.026) (0.041)
VCavailability abroad 0-50 km -0.024 -0.027
(0.020) (0.028)
VCavailability abroad 50-250 km -0.001 -0.011
(0.005) (0.007)
VCavailability abroad 250-500 km 0.005 0.015
(0.006) (0.010)
VCavailability abroad 500-1000 km 0.004 0.014
(0.010) (0.014)
VCavailability abroad 1000-5000 km 0.009 -0.032
(0.021) (0.040)
VCavailability abroad 0-500 km 0.001 0.013
(0.006) (0.009)
VCconcentration local -0.013 -0.029 0.007 0.006
(0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
age 0.003 0.045∗∗∗ 0.003 0.045∗∗∗ 0.003 0.047∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016)
manager 0.077∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
serial -0.065∗∗ -0.060∗ -0.061∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
MBA 0.085∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.084∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
PhD science 0.061 0.061 0.058
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
cashflow/sales -0.123∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
debt/totalassets 0.011 0.012 0.012
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
CAPEX/assets 1.238 1.227 1.235
(1.050) (1.050) (1.048)
patents stock 0.091∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.080∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
totalassets 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d accounting missing 0.011 0.010 0.011
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
debt local 0.217∗∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.238∗∗
(0.092) (0.093) (0.093)
patents local -0.034 -0.056∗∗ -0.043∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
GDP local 0.048 0.069∗ 0.058
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
area local 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MSCI national 0.209∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
bankruptcylaws national 0.002 -0.004 -0.006
(0.038) (0.035) (0.034)
infrastructures national -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.022 -0.471 -0.009 -0.640 0.139∗ -0.615
(0.221) (0.526) (0.210) (0.575) (0.084) (0.458)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N observations 5101 3412 5101 3412 5101 3412
N groups 533 404 533 404 533 404
R2 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses
Legend: The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of panel random effects models whose
dependent variable is VCseeking. Significance levels: * p < 0.10;** p < 0.05;*** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Seeking external equity: robustness checks with weighted specification, panel random-
effects models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Without firms
seeking at
foundation
Without firms
not needing
On matched
sample
Without VC-
backed firms
With IMR on
response
Excluding
bubble period
Using
invested-firm
location
VCavailability local 0.018∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.016∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.021) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
VCavailability national (α=1) 0.036∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.056∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.023) (0.033) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
VCavailability abroad (α=0.3) -0.181 -0.003 0.197 0.045 0.017 0.015
(0.120) (0.164) (0.274) (0.111) (0.133) (0.117)
VCavailability local
(using invested-companies location) 0.016∗
(0.009)
VCavailability national (α=1)
(using invested-companies location) 0.245∗∗
(0.101)
VCavailability abroad (α=0.3)
(using invested-companies location) -0.187
(0.182)
VCconcentration local -0.028 -0.028 -0.068∗ -0.001 -0.030∗ -0.031
(0.020) (0.028) (0.038) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021)
age 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.593∗∗∗
(0.029)
Constant 0.163 -0.773 -2.528∗∗ -0.551 0.859∗ -0.599 -0.359
(0.569) (0.710) (1.237) (0.536) (0.506) (0.558) (0.604)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HC variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Accounting variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N observations 2867 2314 1048 2801 3412 2922 3412
N groups 329 307 258 264 404 381 404
R2 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses
Legend: The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of panel random effects models whose
dependent variable is VCseeking. Significance levels: * p < 0.10;** p < 0.05;*** p < 0.01.
39
Table 6: Seeking external equity: the effect of the type and reputation of the investors, panel
random-effects models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VCavail IVC national 0-50 km 0.015∗∗
(0.007)
VCavail IVC national 50-250 km 0.016∗∗
(0.008)
VCavail IVC national 250-500 km -0.003
(0.009)
VCavail IVC abroad 0-500 km 0.014
(0.009)
VCavail GVC national 0-50 km 0.024∗∗∗
(0.009)
VCavail GVC national 50-250 km 0.012
(0.010)
VCavail GVC national 250-500 km 0.002
(0.010)
VCavail GVC abroad 0-500 km -0.003
(0.008)
VCavail lowrep national 0-50 km 0.018∗∗
(0.007)
VCavail lowrep national 50-250 km 0.021∗∗∗
(0.008)
VCavail lowrep national 250-500 km -0.003
(0.008)
VCavail lowrep abroad 0-500 km 0.011
(0.009)
VCavail highrep national 0-50 km 0.005
(0.008)
VCavail highrep national 50-250 km 0.010
(0.007)
VCavail highrep national 250-500 km -0.012
(0.007)
VCavail highrep abroad 0-500 km 0.014∗∗
(0.007)
age 0.047∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant -0.688 -0.420 -0.667 -0.711
(0.459) (0.423) (0.450) (0.441)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
HC variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Accounting variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N observations 3412 3412 3412 3412
N groups 404 404 404 404
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses
Legend: The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of panel random effects models whose
dependent variable is VCseeking. Significance levels: * p < 0.10;** p < 0.05;*** p < 0.01.
40
Table 7: Seeking external equity: the effect of cultural and institutional distance, panel random-
effects models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VCavailability national 0-50 km 0.018∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.014∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
VCavailability national 50-250 km 0.016∗ 0.015∗ 0.014∗ 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
VCavailability national 250-500 km -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
VCavail culturefar 0-500 km 0.006
(0.009)
VCavail cultureclose 0-500 km 0.015∗
(0.009)
VCavail institutionsfar 0-500 km 0.012
(0.009)
VCavail institutionsclose 0-500 km 0.016∗∗
(0.007)
age 0.046∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant -0.626 -0.590 -0.645 -0.513
(0.459) (0.458) (0.459) (0.460)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
HC variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Accounting variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N observations 3412 3412 3412 3412
N groups 404 404 404 404
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses
Legend: The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of panel random effects models whose
dependent variable is VCseeking. Significance levels: * p < 0.10;** p < 0.05;*** p < 0.01.
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Figure 1: Percentage of sample ventures seeking external equity by age class
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Figure 2: Total number of new investments by VC investors’ location (1984-2009)
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Source: own elaboration based on Thomson One data. Please note that each VC investment is counted more
than once when it is syndicated, i.e. an investment made by 3 VC investors is counted as one for each NUTS2
region where the investors are located.
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Figure 3: Number of new investments made by European VC investors and percentage of
sample ventures seeking external equity by year
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Figure 4: The estimated effects of VC availability and distance on ventures’ propensity to
search external equity
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Legend: The figure shows the change in a venture’s propensity to seek external equity for a change in the
number of new investments in a NUTS2 region within national borders (” non-local national availability” line)
from 1 to 21 (respectively equal to the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the distribution), depending on
geographic distance between the venture’s location and the centroid of the focal region. For the sake of
comparison we also report the effect generated by the same increase of the number of new VC investments on
the external equity seeking behavior of ventures located in the same region (see the ”local availability” line).
The vertical dotted lines represent the 25th, 50th ans 75th percentile of the distribution of the distance of
venture’s location from the 50 VC hubs.
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Figure A1: Calibration of the decay parameters for distance
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Table A1: Seeking external equity: robustness checks with radius specification, panel random-
effects models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Without firms
seeking at
foundation
Without firms
not needing
On matched
sample
Without VC-
backed firms
With IMR on
response
Excluding
bubble period
Using
invested-firm
location
VCavailability national 0-50 km 0.018∗∗ 0.014 0.028∗ 0.013∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
VCavailability national 50-250 km 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.016∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.015∗
(0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
VCavailability national 250-500 km -0.006 -0.003 -0.027 -0.004 -0.000 -0.007
(0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
VCavailability abroad 0-500 km 0.015 0.018 0.030 0.009 0.009 0.011
(0.009) (0.013) (0.021) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
VCavailability national 0-50 km
(using invested-companies location) 0.007
(0.006)
VCavailability national 50-250 km
(using invested-companies location) 0.021∗∗
(0.008)
VCavailability national 250-500 km
(using invested-companies location) 0.007
(0.008)
VCavailability abroad 0-500 km
(using invested-companies location) 0.012
(0.009)
age 0.073∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.588∗∗∗
(0.033)
Constant -0.318 -0.941 -2.015∗ -0.509 0.616 -0.595 -0.880∗∗
(0.491) (0.613) (1.055) (0.469) (0.434) (0.485) (0.438)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HC variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Accounting variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N observations 2867 2314 1048 2801 3412 2922 3412
N groups 329 307 258 264 404 381 404
R2 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses
Legend: The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of panel random effects models whose
dependent variable is VCseeking. Significance levels: * p < 0.10;** p < 0.05;*** p < 0.01.
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